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OF "PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY":
THE EFFECT OF NONCOMPLIANCE
WITH CONTRACT CLAIMS
PROCEDURES
THOMAS J. STIPANOWICH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Long before arbitration attracted public attention as a wide-
ranging alternative to litigation, construction contractors and
building owners submitted controversies to adjudication by pri-
vate panels of experts.' Despite continuing controversy regard-
ing its ascribed virtues,2 arbitration remains a popular means of
resolving disputes associated with building design and
construction. 3
In current industry models, construction arbitration repre-
sents the final stage in a complex process of dispute resolution.4
Before arbitrating, parties advancing a claim typically are re-
quired to put the matter before the project architect or engineer
and to observe various notification and filing requirements for
initiation of the arbitration process.' A claimant's noncompli-
ance with the contractual recipe for handling disputes often
raises questions regarding the enforceability of the arbitration
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.S., 1974;
M. Architecture, 1976; J.D., 1980, University of Illinois. This article is one of a series
dealing with various aspects of commercial arbitration.
1. Arbitration provisions have appeared in American construction contracts for
the better part of two centuries. See Coulson, Preface to M. GIBBONS & L. MILLER, CON-
STRUCTION ARBITRATION: SELECTED READINGS at v (1981).
2. See generally Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425
(1988) (summarizing perceived advantages and shortcomings of commercial arbitration
and analyzing A.B.A. survey data on attorney attitudes toward arbitration of construc-
tion disputes).
3. An extensive, thoughtful treatment of statutory and case law affecting all as-
pects of construction arbitration is provided in J. ACRTr, CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION
HANDBOOK (1985).
4. See infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
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agreement.6 Some courts thereupon deny that party the right to
arbitrate,7 while others, mindful of contemporary policies favor-
ing agreements to arbitrate, stay their hand and leave proce-
dural issues to the arbitrators." At least one jurisdiction, on the
other hand, has sought a middle ground.'
This article surveys contemporary judicial attitudes regard-
ing the effect of noncompliance with procedures for handling
claims and controversies. 10 It also analyzes the policies advanced
in support of deferring questions of "procedural arbitrability" to
arbitration11 and proposes a straightforward rationale for judi-
cial disposition of such issues.2 Although the discussion empha-
sizes scenarios involving construction contracts, the principles
addressed in this article are applicable to commercial arbitration
agreements generally and may be extended by analogy to the
labor sphere."
II. TREATMENT OF PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES TO ARBITRATED
RESOLUTION OF CLAIMS
A. Dispute Resolution Under Construction Contracts
For many years the construction industry has functioned as
a laboratory for development of private dispute resolution sys-
tems. The modern industry archetype is a multistage process in-
cluding first-tier adjudication by design professionals and, when
necessary, submission of controversies to a neutral panel of arbi-
6. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 27-48 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 49-73 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 74-100 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 27-100 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 104-159 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 159-205 and accompanying text.
13. While labor arbitration and commercial arbitration differ in character and pur-
pose, labor precedents often are considered in commercial cases and vice versa. See
Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsid-
ered, 66 B.U.L. REV. 953 (1986); see also Swift Indus. v. Botany Indus., 466 F.2d 1125,
1129-30 (3d Cir. 1972) (discussing general principles of law governing disputes about an
arbitrator's authority and noting their applicability in both commercial and labor arbi-
trations). An incisive commentary on procedural issues under collective bargaining agree-
ments was provided by Alan Schwartz in Note, Procedural Arbitrability Under Section
301 of the LMRA, 73 YALE L.J. 1459 (1964).
[Vol. 40
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trators.14 In recent editions of the widely used general construc-
tion contract promulgated by the American Institute of Archi-
tects (AIA), this procedure has grown in detail and complexity. 15
The current AIA version imposes a series of procedural requi-
sites on those who would put forward a claim or try a dispute.1
6
Under AIA procedure, disagreements between project own-
ers and contractors regarding payments of money, time exten-
sions, and other issues concerning contract terms or performance
must be referred initially to the project architect for his deci-
sion. 7 With certain limited exceptions, disputes that the archi-
tect fails to resolve to the parties' satisfaction may be settled by
arbitration."i Among other things, a party desiring arbitration
must file a demand within thirty days of receipt of the archi-
tect's decision if that decision was in writing, specified that it
was "final but subject to arbitration," and required initiation of
arbitration within that period.19 Otherwise, the demand must be
filed "within a reasonable time after the claim has arisen."2
In addition to setting forth a detailed process for dispute
resolution, the AIA document establishes separate guidelines for
pursuing various claims. For example, claims by either party
must be made in writing "within 21 days after occurrence of the
14. See, e.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS, AIA DOCUMENT A201, GENERAL
CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION, §§ 4.3-.5 (1987) [hereinafter AIA
A201].
15. Compare AIA A201, supra note 14, with AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ARCHITECTS,
AIA DOCUMENT A201, GENERAL CONDITIONS OF THE CONTRACT FOR CONSTRUCTION,
§§ 2.2.12, 7.9, 8.3, 12.0 (1976 ed.). For a penetrating critique of recent changes in the
AIA dispute resolution system, see J. SWEET, SWEET ON CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY CON-
TRACTS §§ 11.8-.17 (1987).
16. See supra note 14; see also SWEET, supra note 15, §§ 22.1-.26 (1987) (discussing
arbitration under the current AIA A201).
17. See AIA A201, supra note 14, § 4.3.2.
18. The substantive scope of the agreement to arbitrate is set forth as follows:
Any controversy or Claim arising out of or related to the Contract, or the
breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Construc-
tion Industry Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, and
judgment upon the award rendered by the arbitrator or arbitrators may be
entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof, except controversies or Claims
related to aesthetic effect and except those waived [by the making of final pay-
ment]. Such controversies or Claims upon which the Architect has given notice
and rendered a decision . . . shall be subject to arbitration upon written de-
mand of either party.
Id. § 4.5.1.
19. Id. § 4.5.4.1.
20. Id. § 4.5.4.2.
3
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event" that triggered them.2' Further detailed instructions are
provided for handling both claims associated with differing site
conditions and contractor claims for adjustments of the contract
price or timetable.22 Still other provisions direct that certain
owner and contractor claims may be waived by the making and
acceptance of final payment.
23
Noncompliance with any of these contractual requisites may
call into question the claimant's right to present his case before
a panel of arbitrators. The issue may come before a court as a
defense to a motion to compel arbitration 24 or to stay related
litigation pending arbitration of disputes;2 it also may be raised
in support of a petition to enjoin arbitration proceedings. 26 Judi-
cial responses to the problem reflect a substantial difference of
opinion regarding treatment of contract terms governing
processing of contract-related disputes and courts' and arbitra-
tors' roles in handling procedural issues.
B. Decisions Supporting Judicial Resolution of Procedural
Issues
In some jurisdictions, questions arising from an alleged fail-
ure to meet time limits for the filing of arbitration demands or
to satisfy other procedural prerequisites for arbitration are justi-
ciable By assuming responsibility for such determinations,
tribunals enhance their ability to preclude arbitration of claims.
This judicial attitude is exemplified by the decision of the
21. Id. § 4.3.3.
22. See id. § 4.3.6.
23. See id. § 4.3.5.
24. See, e.g., Contracting Northwest, Inc. v. City of Fredericksburg, 713 F.2d 382
(8th Cir. 1983).
25. See, e.g., Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Constr. Co., 729 F.2d
334 (5th Cir. 1984).
26. See, e.g., United Nations Dev. Corp. v. Norkin Plumbing Co., 45 N.Y.2d 358,
380 N.E.2d 253, 408 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1978).
27. See, e.g., Frank J. Rooney, Inc. v. Food Fair Indus., 254 So. 2d 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1971); Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc., 274 Md. 307, 334
A.2d 526 (1975); Stauffer Constr. Co. v. Board of Educ., 54 Md. App. 658, 460 A.2d 609
(Ct. Spec. App. 1983); Torcon, Inc. v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 205 N.J. Super. 428, 501 A.2d
182 (Ct. Ch. Div. 1985), aff'd per curiam, 209 N.J. Super. 239, 507 A.2d 284 (Ct. App.
Div.), cert. denied, 104 N.J. 440, 517 A.2d 431 (1986); Brick Township Mun. Util. Auth.
v. Diversified R.B.& T. Constr. Co., 171 N.J. Super. 397, 409 A.2d 806 (Ct. App. Div.
1979); Geo. V. Nolte & Co. v. Pieler Constr. Co., 54 Wash. 2d 30, 337 P.2d 710 (1959).
[Vol. 40
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Maryland Court of Appeals in Frederick Contractors, Inc. v. Bel
Pre Medical Center, Inc.28 The case arose from an owner's re-
fusal to honor a contractor's requisition for payment under a
contract for construction of a nursing home.2 9 The contractor
sought to enjoin the owner's efforts to arbitrate the dispute be-
cause, inter alia, the owner had failed to demand arbitration
within a "reasonable time" after the claim had arisen. Such de-
mand was required by the AIA-type general conditions incorpo-
rated in the parties' contract.3 0 The trial court granted the in-
junction after finding that the owner's demand, which postdated
the contractor's lien foreclosure action, was not filed in a timely
manner.3 1 On appeal by the owner, the Maryland Court of Spe-
cial Appeals vacated the injunction, concluding that "question[s]
of compliance with the procedural requisite of a timely demand"
arising in the context of an otherwise arbitrable dispute was for
the arbitrators and not the courts to resolve.3 2 Although the Ma-
ryland Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, it made clear that
the timeliness of the demand was, "in the first instance, for the
courts."33 Ignoring the trial court's contrary finding, the court of
appeals held that the owner's demand "was made within the
reasonable time stipulated by [the] General Conditions." 34
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals offered no ration-
ale in support of the Bel Pre holding, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals ventured one in a later decision. In Stauffer
Construction Co. v. Board of Education3 5 that court viewed Bel
Pre as an exercise of judicial authority to determine the "exis-
tence or enforceability of the agreement to arbitrate," the role
mandated for courts under the applicable arbitration statute.36
The Stauffer court reasoned that the lateness of the owner's de-
mand, arguably resulting in a "waiver" of its right to arbitrate,
raised questions about the continued existence of a mutually
28. 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975).
29. See id. at 308, 334 A.2d at 527.
30. See id. at 310-11, 334 A.2d at 528-29.
31. See id. at 309, 334 A.2d at 528.
32. See Bel Pre Medical Center, Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App.
307, 323, 320 A.2d 558, 567 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974).
33. 274 Md. at 309, 334 A.2d at 530.
34. See id. at 315, 334 A.2d at 531.
35. 54 Md. App. 658, 460 A.2d 609 (Ct. Spec. App. 1983).
36. See id. at 666, 460 A.2d at 613.
1989]
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binding agreement to arbitrate disputes: 7
Because an inappropriate delay in demanding arbitration acts
as a relinquishment of the contractual right to compel such a
proceeding, where that matter is in dispute, its resolution con-
stitutes, in effect, a determination of whether the agreement to
arbitrate still exists; and, under the statute, that is a proper
issue for the court. 8
Stauffer involved review of the denial of a construction
company's demand for arbitration of various disputes with the
project owner3s The court concluded that the contractor's fail-
ure to present claims to the project architect in accordance with
the requirements of the AIA-type construction contract
amounted to a waiver of the right to arbitrate and precluded
enforcement of the arbitration clause.40 The court of special ap-
peals vacated the trial court's judgment because the lower court
improperly had addressed issues going to the merits of the un-
derlying claims 41 and failed to consider, among other things,
whether the claimant had waived its right to arbitrate by not
making a timely demand for arbitration.42 The court remanded
the case for consideration of factual issues bearing upon the pos-
sible waiver.45 Other opinions supporting judicial treatment of
contractual procedural questions emphasize the court's desire to
37. See id.
38. Id. at 668, 460 A.2d at 614. The court concluded that a determination that the
right to arbitrate had been relinquished would have "no bearing ... upon either the
validity or the enforceability of the underlying claims," but only would remit them to the
judicial process. See id. This conclusion conflicts with the weight of judicial opinion,
which regards the election to arbitrate as a waiver of the right to judicial resolution of
disputes. See infra note 201 and accompanying text. Significantly, the same court later
upheld a trial court order granting a summary judgment to a defendant on the basis that
the plaintiff had waived the right to arbitrate by failing to initiate arbitration properly;
having lost the right to arbitrate, the court concluded, the plaintiff was not entitled to
relief in court. See Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp., No. 1732 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
Aug. 4, 1982) (per curiam) (unreported), rev'd, 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983).
39. As in Bel Pre, the parties' contract incorporated the AIA Form 201 General
Conditions. See Stauffer, 54 Md. App. at 669, 460 A.2d at 615.
40. See id. at 672, 460 A.2d at 616.
41. According to the court of special appeals, the trial court erred by denying arbi-
tration on the basis of the contractor's noncompliance with contractual provisions re-
quiring that requests for increased compensation and extensions of time be made within
a specific period after events causing increased cost or delay. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
[Vol. 40
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effectuate the parties' intent with respect to arbitration. In
Brick Township Municipal Utilities Authority v. Diversified
R.B.&T. Construction Co.44 a New Jersey appellate court ac-
knowledged the broad public policy favoring arbitration, but ob-
served that judicial enforcement of arbitration depended upon
mutual assent of the parties to the process.4 5 On this basis the
court enjoined a contractor from arbitrating contract-related
disputes with a project owner because the contractor failed to
file an arbitration demand within thirty days after the project
engineer rendered a decision; the contract provided that such a
failure would render the engineer's decision final and binding.
46
One early New York decision, which denied arbitration
when the claimant missed the contractual deadline for filing a
demand, concluded that this approach actually promoted the
policy favoring agreements to arbitrate.47 The court reasoned
that although the claimant's delay foreclosed the right to a hear-
ing before arbitrators, the parties' intent respecting resolution of
disputes nevertheless was fulfilled by enforcement of the provi-
sional time limit.48
C. Decisions Deferring Questions of "Procedural
Arbitrability" to Arbitration
In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston9 the Supreme
Court enunciated a broad policy favoring arbitrability of issues
associated with procedural limitations on arbitration. The case,
which arose under the Taft-Hartley Act,50 concerned a union's
motion to compel arbitration under the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The corporate employer raised certain issues
in response to the motion, including the union's noncompliance
44. 171 N.J. Super. 397, 409 A.2d 806 (Ct. App. Div. 1979).
45. See id. at 402, 409 A.2d at 808.
46. See id. at 402-03, 409 A.2d at 808-09. The contract provided that "no demand
for arbitration shall be made later than thirty (30) days after the date which the engineer
rendered his written decision," and "the failure to demand arbitration within said thirty
(30) day period shall result in the engineer's decision being final and binding." Id. at 402,
409 A.2d at 808.
47. See River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 110
N.E.2d 545, 548-49 (1953).
48. See id.
49. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
50. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
1989] 853
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with certain steps in the stipulated grievance procedure leading
up to arbitration. 1 The Court rejected the employer's conten-
tion that the latter issue was one for the courts and not the arbi-
trator. It also expressed the concern that questions regarding the
applicability of grievance procedures and compliance with such
requirements often were inseparable from the merits of the un-
derlying dispute and, therefore, should be left to the arbitrator's
informed discretion.52 Thus, the Court concluded, "Once it is de-
termined . . that the parties are obligated to submit the sub-
ject matter of a dispute to arbitration, 'procedural' questions
which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition
should be left to the arbitrator.""3 According to the Court, a con-
trary rule inevitably would involve judges in the difficult task of
distinguishing justiciable "procedural" questions from nonjusti-
ciable substantive issues54 and would increase the probability of
delays to the commencement of arbitration, 5 "contrary to the
aims of national labor policy."5 "
Although Wiley concerned the purposes and policies under-
51. See id. The action was brought by the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store
Union against John Wiley & Sons, Inc., pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement
with Interscience Publishers, Inc., a company that subsequently merged with Wiley. See
376 U.S. at 544-45. When Wiley refused to recognize the prior collective bargaining
agreement or the representative status of the union under that agreement, the union
sought arbitration of the issues. See id. at 546. Although the district court denied its
motion to compel arbitration, the district court, the Second Circuit reversed that judg-
ment and ordered arbitration. See Wiley, 313 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1963). The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in order to consider: (1) the effect of corporate mergers on arbitration
clauses incorporated in prior collective bargaining agreements and (2) whether courts or
arbitrators were responsible for determining if procedural prerequisites to arbitration,
which were incorporated in the stipulated grievance procedures, have been met. 376 U.S.
at 544.
The agreement before the Court established a three-step grievance procedure. The
initial step was a conference between the affected employee, a union steward, and an
employer representative. If that conference failed to resolve the dispute, a second confer-
ence, attended by an employer's officer or representative and the union shop committee
or a union representative, could be held. Should this second step fail to resolve the dis-
pute, the matter was to be submitted to arbitration. The employer alleged that the union
had failed to comply with the first two steps prior to seeking arbitration, thereby releas-
ing the employer from any duty to arbitrate. See id. at 555-56.
52. See id. at 556-57; see also infra notes 104-118 and accompanying text.
53. Id. at 557. The Court already had concluded that in the case before it, the
arbitration clause was sufficiently broad to cover the subject matter of the parties' dis-
pute. See id, at 553-55.
54. See id. at 558.
55. See id; see also infra notes 140-151 and accompanying text.
56. Id.
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lying arbitration under federal labor law,57 that decision has
greatly influenced judicial treatment of "procedural arbi-
trability" questions arising under commercial contracts. Del E.
Webb Construction v. Richardson Hospital Authority 8 is exem-
plary of the trend among federal courts. 9 In that case the Fifth
Circuit ruled that a federal district court lacked authority to
consider contractual requirements regarding the filing of an ar-
bitration demand in acting upon a motion to compel arbitration
under section 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).6 0 Observ-
ing that the FAA required courts to order arbitration "upon be-
ing satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue,""' the court fol-
lowed Wiley and held that compliance with contractual prereq-
uisites was an issue for the arbitrator.6 2
The Eighth Circuit used similar reasoning in Contracting
Northwest, Inc. v. City of Fredericksburg.6 The court in that
case affirmed a judicial order compelling a municipality to arbi-
trate disputes under a construction contract and staying related
litigation. It refused to entertain the city's objections that the
construction contractor had failed to deliver a demand within
ten days of the project engineer's decision as required by the
contract and also had failed to comply with EPA and contrac-
tual requirements regarding certification and documentation of
claims.6 4 The court found that the parties had agreed to arbi-
trate "a dispute about any matter involving a decision of the
Engineer" and, therefore, had obligated themselves to submit
the subject matter of the instant disputes to arbitration. 5 Be-
cause the city's objections were "procedural" issues growing out
57. See id. at 559.
58. 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987).
59. See, e.g., Commerce Park at DFW Freeport v. Mardian Const. Co., 729 F.2d
334, 339 n.5 (5th Cir. 1984); Contracting Northwest, Inc. v. City of Fredericksburg, 713
F.2d 382, 385-86 (8th Cir. 1983); Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d
1222 (2d Cir. 1980); World Brilliance Corp. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 342 F.2d 362, 365 (2d
Cir. 1965); Siam Feather & Forest Prods. Co. v. Midwest Feather Co., 503 F. Supp. 239,
241-42 (S.D. Ohio 1980), afl'd, 663 F.2d 1073 (6th Cir. 1981).
60. See 823 F.2d at 149.
61. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982)).
62. See id.
63. 713 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1983).
64. See id. at 385-86.
65. See id.
1989]
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of an otherwise arbitrable dispute and affecting its eventual dis-
position, only the arbitrators, the court concluded, had the au-
thority to dispose of them."6
These judicial attitudes are mirrored in the state courts, as
illustrated by Village of Carpentersville v. Mayfair Construc-
tion Co. 67 That decision concerned a village's request for a judi-
cial declaration that claims submitted by a contractor under a
contract for the reconstruction of waste-treatment facilities were
nonarbitrable. Among other things, the village asserted that the
contractor had failed to comply with certain contractual precon-
ditions to arbitration, including time limits associated with
claims related to owner-ordered changes and requirements for
filing an arbitration demand after a decision of the project archi-
tect-engineer.88 Finding no controlling authority on the subject,
the court surveyed opinions of other state courts and found that
the majority favored arbitration of questions of compliance with
contract procedures."' Concluding that "[p]rocedural questions
often cannot be resolved without construing the contract as a
whole and the transactions under the contract in light of the
customs and practices of the industry[,J . . . [a] task peculiarly
within the competence of the arbitrator," the court ruled that
"matters of timeliness and waiver and the other procedural mat-
ters in question" were arbitrable.7"
Liberal judicial attitudes toward arbitrability of procedural
matters affect not only issues raised by missed filing deadlines
but also those raised by noncompliance with provisions requiring
submission of disputes to design professionals. In Village of
Carpentersville, for example, the contractor's retainage claims
were held arbitrable even though no claim for retainage had
been filed with the project architect, and therefore, the architect
66. See id. at 386.
67. 100 II. App. 3d 128, 426 N.E.2d 558 (1981). For other representative state
court cases, see Pettinaro Constr. Co. v. Harry C. Partridge, Jr. & Sons, Inc., 408 A.2d
957 (Del. Ch. 1979); Bartley, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 302 So. 2d 280, 282-83
(La. 1974); Willis-Knighton Medical Center v. Southern Builders, Inc., 392 So. 2d 505,
507-08 (La. App. Ct. 1980); Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Constr. Co., 92 Nev. 721, 558 P.2d 517
(1976); Kardon v. Portare, 466 Pa. 306, 353 A.2d 368 (1976); Shamokin Area School
Auth. v. Farfield Co., 308 Pa. Super. 271, 279, 454 A.2d 126, 127 (1982).
68. See 100 I1. App. 3d at 129-30, 426 N.E.2d at 560-61.
69. See id. at 132-33, 426 N.E.2d at 562.
70. Id. at 133, 426 N.E.2d at 562-63.
856 [Vol. 40
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had rendered no appealable decision.7 1 The court noted that
while the contract provided that the design professional "shall
render decisions. . . on all matters pertaining to the progress of
the work," the failure to seek the architect's decision was a
"matter of procedural arbitrability not subject matter arbi-
trability. ' '1 2 Similarly, in Contracting Northwest the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that a contractor's failure to submit requested docu-
mentation to the project engineer was arbitrable under a clause
providing for arbitration of "any matter involving a decision of
the Engineer.
'7 3
D. The New York Approach: A Middle Ground
Since New York pioneered the field of commercial arbitra-
tion, its courts frequently - and, often, persuasively - have ad-
dressed various aspects of the subject.7 4 In a series of decisions
dealing with procedural prerequisites to arbitration, New York
courts have defined a unique approach to their treatment.
Initially New York tribunals dealt routinely with contrac-
tual time limitations when considering the enforceability of
agreements to arbitrate.7 5 In River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. La-
trobe Brewing Co.7 6 the court of appeals affirmed a stay of arbi-
tration under the terms of a sales contract because the claimant-
buyer had failed to comply with the requirement that "'[a]ny
71. See id. at 134, 426 N.E.2 at 563.
72. Id. at 563. In another case the Louisiana Supreme Court ordered arbitration of
contractor claims against an owner despite the latter's contention that arbitration would
be "premature," or alternatively that arbitration had been waived, because the claims
never were submitted to the project architect. See Bartley, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish
School Bd., 302 So. 2d 280, 283 (La. 1974). Finding no grounds upon which to deny
enforcement of the arbitration agreement, the court concluded that such questions of
"procedural arbitrability" themselves were arbitrable. See id. The court did not attempt
to reconcile this conclusion with the language of the arbitration agreement, which pro-
vided for arbitration only of "[a]ny claim, dispute or other matter that has been referred
to the Architect." Id. at 282 n.4.
73. 713 F.2d at 386.
74. For a summary of pertinent decisions by the state's highest court, see Jones,
Arbitration From the Viewpoint of the Practicing Attorney: An Analysis of Arbitration
Cases Decided By the New York State Court of Appeals from January, 1973 to Septem-
ber, 1985, 14 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 523 (1986).
75. See River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 110
N.E.2d 545 (1953); In re Duke Laboratories, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 779, 168 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).
76. 305 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d 545 (1953).
1989]
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demand for arbitration must be made within five days after
tender.' "7 The disputed issues once were referable to arbitra-
tion, reasoned the court, but were "no longer so referable only
because the parties wrote their own time limitation beyond
which no step toward such relief could be taken.17 By denying
the buyer the right to arbitrate, then, the court was doing no
more than enforcing the parties' own agreement, including their
"exclusive remedy for its attempted breach. 79
In the wake of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in John
Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston,s" however, the New York court
announced a different rule for arbitration under the terms of
collective bargaining agreements. In Long Island Lumber Co. v.
Martin"' the court declared that under the terms of section 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act 2 as well as the law of New York, issues
regarding compliance with "steps preliminary and necessary to"
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement were arbitra-
ble and not justiciable.8 3 The case concerned a contract griev-
ance procedure requiring controversies to be referred initially to
a "committee of Arbitration" consisting of representatives of the
union and the employer; if the committee could not agree on a
decision, the matter was to be submitted for final and binding
arbitration before a designated trucking industry tribunal.8 4
During a wage dispute, the employer sought and received a stay
of the second arbitration proceedings because no properly estab-
lished "committee" had first reviewed the matter;8 5 the union
appealed from an affirmation of the order by the appellate divi-
sion. 86 Reversing the lower courts, the court of appeals cited the
body of federal labor law supporting the presumption that ques-
tions of arbitrability are for arbitrators.8 7 Absent "unmis-
takeably clear language" deferring issues of procedure or sub-
stance to the courts, it concluded, such matters were
77. Id. at 39, 110 N.E.2d at 546.
78. Id. at 43, 110 N.E.2d at 548.
79. Id.
80. 376 U.S. 543 (1964). See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
81. 15 N.Y.2d 380, 207 N.E.2d 190, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142 (1965).
82. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1958).
83. See 15 N.Y.2d at 382, 207 N.E.2d at 191, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
84. See id. at 383, 207 N.E.2d at 191-92, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 144-45.
85. See id. at 384, 207 N.E.2d at 192, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 384-85, 207 N.E.2d at 192-93, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 145-47.
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arbitrable.8 Of particular significance was Wiley, which involved
circumstances similar to those before the court of appeals, and
its conclusion that procedural questions arising from an other-
wise arbitrable dispute were to be left to the arbitrator. 9 Under
the broad language of the arbitration provision in the parties'
collective bargaining agreement, which covered "'all griev-
ances'" and "'all disputes with respect to the interpretation of
this agreement,'" the court concluded that both procedural and
substantive issues were arbitrable9 0
Although the Long Island Lumber decision specifically was
limited to labor cases, 9' its rationale eventually was extended to
commercial arbitration. In Board of Education v. Wager Con-
struction Corp.,92 a case concerning disputes under a construc-
tion contract, the court of appeals cited Long Island Lumber
and other decisions for the proposition that while statutory pre-
requisites to arbitration were justiciable, "under a broad arbitra-
tion clause timely compliance with contractual notice provisions
.. .as well as various time requirements in grievance procedure,
pose issues whose resolution lies solely with the arbitrator."9
The New York courts, however, identified an apparent ex-
ception to this broad mandate for leaving procedural questions
to arbitrators: the issue of compliance with terms that were clear
conditions precedent to arbitration. The court of appeals made
this manifest in United Nations Development Corp. v. Norkin
Plumbing Co.,95 a decision that attempted to categorize and rec-
oncile previous opinions dealing with contractual limitations on
arbitration procedures. The court considered the justiciability of
a claimant's failure to comply with provisions of a subcontract
88. See id. at 385, 207 N.E.2d at 193, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 146.
89. See id. at 385-86, 207 N.E.2d at 193, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 146-47. Although the New
York court quoted Wiley at length in support of its decision, its observation that parties,
by clear expressions of intent, may reserve procedural as well as substantive issues for
the courts is a caveat unstated in the Supreme Court's decision. See infra notes 181-205
and accompanying text.
90. See id. at 387, 207 N.E.2d at 194, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
91. See id. at 387, 207 N.E.2d at 194, 259 N.Y.S.2d at 148 ("Such a rule would not
be applicable to all situations in which a contract arbitration clause was before the
courts, the doctrine of the present case arising solely from the special economic circum-
stances which surround the institution of collective bargaining.").
92. 37 N.Y.2d 283, 333 N.E.2d 353, 372 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1975).
93. Id. at 289, 333 N.E.2d at 356, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 49.
94. See id. 333 N.E.2d at 356, 372 N.Y.S.2d at 48-49.
95. 45 N.Y.2d 358, 380 N.E.2d 253, 408 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1978).
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that required a "demand for arbitration. .. [to] be made within
60 days after the claim, dispute or other matter in question has
arisen." 96 It concluded that the primary question was "whether
the condition imposed by [the parties'] agreement is an express
or implied condition precedent [to arbitration]." 97 Although is-
sues regarding "compliance with contractual notice provisions"
and "time requirements" generally were arbitrable under
broadly framed arbitration provisions, issues regarding contrac-
tual limitations that were expressly made conditions precedent
initially were questions for the courts.98 Because the parties had
agreed to arbitrate "all claims, disputes and other matters in
question arising out of, or relating to [the] Contract or the
breach thereof,"'99 and the sixty-day filing limit was not an ex-
press condition precedent to submission of a claim or dispute to
arbitration, the defense based on lack of compliance was for the
arbitrator and not the court.100
Whatever the New York approach may have to recommend
it, the weight of judicial opinion still favors the "all or nothing"
rationale advanced by the Supreme Court in John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston.'0' Since Wiley set forth the case for
deferring matters of "procedural arbitrability" to arbitrators in
labor disputes, its logic has been applied uncritically in numer-
ous commercial cases. 102 An analytical perspective on the poli-
96. Id. at 362, 380 N.E.2d at 254, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 426.
97. Id. 380 N.E.2d at 255, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
98. See id. at 363, 380 N.E.2d at 255-56, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 427-28.
99. Id. at 364, 380 N.E.2d at 256, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
100. See id. at 364-65, 380 N.E.2d at 256, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 428.
101. See supra notes 58-73 and accompanying text. A few courts in other jurisdic-
tions have explicitly adopted the New York approach to the treatment of procedural
limitations. See, e.g., Public Health Trust v. M.R. Harrison Constr. Co., 451 So. 2d 756,
757-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing New York precedents approvingly). Other deci-
sions, while not referencing New York law, have adopted a similar rationale. See, e.g.,
Brinkman v. Buffalo Bills Football Club, 433 F. Supp. 699 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (barring
breach of contract claims because claimant failed to follow contractual conditions prece-
dent to arbitration); see also Conticommodity Serv., Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d
1222, 1227 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating in dicta that questions regarding the effect of time
limitations were arbitrable "in the absence of express language in the contract referring
to a court questions concerning the timeliness of a demand for arbitration"). In Village
of Carpentersville v. Mayfair Constr. Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 128, 426 N.E.2d 558 (1981), the
court cited Norkin Plumbing but did not explicitly adopt the approach of that case even
though it determined that "no express condition precedent" to arbitration was present in
the case before it. Id. at 133, 426 N.E.2d at 562.
102. See cases cited supra notes 58-59,
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cies offered in support of categorical deferral of procedural ques-
tions is long overdue."0 3
III. AN APPRECIATION OF CONCERNS UNDERLYING JUDICIAL
DEFERMENT OF "PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY" QUESTIONS
A. Concerns Regarding the Intertwining of Substantive and
Procedural Issues
Courts supporting arbitration of procedural issues fre-
quently note that such questions tend to be intertwined with un-
derlying substantive controversies, which are the arbitrator's
province under the typical broadly framed arbitration provi-
sion.'0 4 This rationale echoes Wiley, in which the Supreme
Court reasoned that "[q]uestions concerning the procedural pre-
requisites to arbitration do not arise in a vacuum; they develop
in the context of an actual dispute about the rights of the par-
ties to the contract or those covered by it."' 0 5
The issue of compliance with pre-arbitration grievance pro-
cedures in Wiley apparently could not be resolved without un-
derstanding the underlying substantive disputes. The contro-
versy concerned the merger of Interscience Publishers, Inc. into
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. and the effect of that corporate reor-
ganization on the existing collective bargaining agreement be-
tween Interscience and a union representing half of its employ-
ees. 106 In response to Wiley's argument that the union had
forfeited the right to arbitrate by failing to comply with contract
provisions requiring settlement conferences, the union insisted
that such steps would have been "utterly futile" in light of the
publisher's refusal to recognize its status.0 The union also ar-
gued that time limitations in the stipulated procedure were not
controlling because the publisher's conduct constituted a contin-
103. For an excellent discussion of procedural arbitrability in labor cases, see Note,
supra note 13.
104. See, e.g., Western Automatic Mach. Screw Co. v. United Auto., Aircraft, & Ag-
ricultural Implement Workers Local 101, 335 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1964); Village of
Carpentersville v. Mayfair Constr. Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 128, 426 N.E.2d 558 (1981); Ex-
her, Inc. v. Sletten Constr. Co., 92 Nev. 721, 558 P.2d 517 (1976).
105. 376 U.S. at 556-57.
106. See id. at 544-46.
107. See id. at 557.
1989] 861
15
Stipanowich: Of "Procedural Arbitrability": The Effect of Noncompliance With C
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
uing violation of the collective bargaining agreement. 108 Because
the union's arguments about procedural questions hinged on the
effect of the merger on the collective bargaining agreement, the
Court refused to allocate questions of substance and procedure
to two different forums.109
Procedural concerns likewise may implicate the merits of an
otherwise arbitrable dispute under the terms of a standard AIA
construction contract." 0 For example, assume a contractor suf-
fers job delays because of the project architect's failure to cor-
rect design deficiencies or to clarify ambiguities in the contract
documents. Faced with serious economic consequences, the con-
tractor informs the project owner that the inaction of the latter's
agent constitutes a material breach of the owner's obligation to
the general contractor and discharges the contractor's obligation
of further performance. When the contractor demands arbitra-
tion of its claim against the owner under the contract or, alter-
natively, a claim for restitution,"' the owner seeks to avoid arbi-
tration on the basis that the contractor failed to present its
claim to the architect in accordance with stipulated dispute res-
olution procedures."2 The contractor responds that submission
to the design professional would be futile since the latter's acts
and omissions were the focus of the underlying dispute. Under
these circumstances a court passing on the "procedural arbi-
trability" issue might involve itself in the very merits of the
case, trespassing on the arbitration panel's domain as defined by
the AIA General Conditions." 3
Whether procedural questions actually implicate the ulti-
mate issues in the case depends in part on how such questions
are framed. In the hypothetical, for example, an allegation that
the architect's repeated failure to correct design deficiencies re-
leased the contractor from the obligation to submit related
108, See id.
109. See id. at 557-58.
110. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
111. Under a broad-form arbitration agreement, such as that contained in the AIA
General Conditions, requests for rescission and restitution generally are regarded as arbi-
trable, See, e.g., Dierson v. Jo Kiem Builders, Inc., 153 Ill. App. 3d 373, 505 N.E.2d 1325
(1987) (affirming motion to compel arbitration of request for rescission based on allega-
tions of fraud in the inducement).
112. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
113. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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owner-contractor disputes to the architect may require substan-
tial inquiry into the the pattern of action or inaction lying at the
heart of the parties' controversy.114 On the other hand, if the
contractor argues that the requirement of first-tier decisionmak-
ing by the architect was not intended to apply to disputes in-
volving the design professional's own acts or omissions, the court
conceivably might address this question of mutual intent with-
out delving deeply into the course of conduct underlying the
contractor's claims for damages. 1 5
Moreover, it is doubtful whether the circumstances of Wiley
and the hypothetical above represent a majority of cases involv-
ing allegations of noncompliance with contractual prerequisites
to arbitration. A party's purported failure to file an arbitration
demand within a contractually stipulated period, while requiring
factual inquiry into the content and timing of written or oral
communications, often bears no relationship to the merits of the
claim or dispute giving rise to the demand." 6 In many cases
there may not even be a real controversy regarding the fact of a
missed deadline.
17
Thus, although Wiley describes a policy committing "proce-
dural arbitrability" issues to arbitration, its broad holding is not
supported by concerns about procedural defenses that are factu-
ally related to the merits of the dispute. Courts nevertheless are
reluctant to limit the Wiley rationale to those cases in which
procedural issues are intertwined with substantive controver-
sies." ' These decisions must be justified by a more broadly
114. This situation would be directly analogous to the circumstances present in
Wiley.
115. In actuality, such an argument would be unavailing under the present form of
the AIA General Conditions. Drafters of that document anticipated such situations and
specified that "[cilaims, including those alleging an error or omission by the Architect,
shall be referred initially to the Architect for action." See AIA A201, supra note 14,
§ 4.3.2 (emphasis added).
116. In this regard a number of courts dealt with arguments that the Wiley ration-
ale does not extend to cases in which procedural issues are independent of the underly-
ing dispute. See, e.g., Tobacco Workers Int'l Union Local 317 v. Lorillard Corp., 448 F.2d
949, 953 (4th Cir. 1971); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. Communication Workers of Am., 340
F.2d 237, 238-39 (2d Cir. 1965); Long Island Lumber Co. v. Martin, 15 N.Y.2d 380, 386-
87, 207 N.E.2d 190, 193, 259 N.Y.S.2d 142, 147 (1965).
117. See, e.g., River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 110
N.E.2d 545 (1953); In re Duke Laboratories, Inc. v. Albert A. Lutz Co., 9 Misc. 2d 779,
168 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
118. See cases cited supra note 116.
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based rationale.
B. Concerns Based Upon the Purposes and Policies Served
by Agreements to Arbitrate
In the commercial sphere as well as the labor arena, agree-
ments to arbitrate are enforced vigorously under contemporary
legislation. 119 Consistent with the notion that by electing arbi-
tration, the parties have chosen their own system of civil justice,
courts tend to adhere strictly to the limits of their enforcement
role under modern statutes and avoid encroachments upon the
domain of the arbitrator. 120 Such concerns are implicit in Wiley
and other judicial decisions deferring issues of contract proce-
dure' to arbitration.
121
Under the Federal Arbitration Act and parallel state stat-
utes, doubts about the scope of an arbitration provision are to be
resolved in favor of arbitrability. 2 2 The liberality of contempo-
rary judicial treatment is reflected by the variety of claims and
disputes referred to arbitration under broad executory agree-
ments to arbitrate, including tort claims,12 3 statutory actions,'
119. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 970-78 (describing broadening
concepts of arbitrability under federal and state statutes).
120. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982), courts have very
limited roles in the enforcement process. See Associated Brick Mason Contractors of
Greater N.Y., Inc. v. Harrington, 820 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1987) (describing the determi-
nations that a court must make under federal arbitration law); Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kaki-
uchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 844 (2d Cir. 1987) (same). The judicial role is similarly circum-
scribed under legislation in most states. See, e.g., Loomis, Inc. v. Cudahy, 104 Idaho 106,
109, 656 P.2d 1359, 1362 (1983) (holding that court's inquiry is limited to determining
the existence of an agreement to arbitrate); Village of Cairo v. Bodine Contracting Co.,
685 S.W.2d 253, 257-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (comparing court's role under the Uniform
Arbitration Act to that under the Federal Arbitration Act).
121. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 559 (1964); Village of
Carpentersville v. Mayfair Constr. Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 128, 135, 426 N.E.2d 558, 562-63
(1981).
122. See, e.g., AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475
U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (doubts regarding scope of an arbitration agreement generally are
resolved in favor of coverage); Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 847
(stating that arbitration should be ordered "unless it may be said with positive assurance
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute"); Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Constr. Co., 92 Nev. 721, 558 P.2d 517, 522 (1976) (cit-
ing Arizona law for the same proposition).
123. See Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 971-72.
124. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 57 U.S.L.W.
4539 (U.S. May 16, 1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S, 427 (1953), and holding
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol40/iss4/3
1989] PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY
petitions for equitable relief,125 and demands for punitive
damages.' 26
By resolving doubts in favor of arbitrability and limiting
their own roles in the enforcement process, courts seek to fur-
ther certain purposes and goals generally associated with arbi-
tration: expert decisionmaking, speed, and economy.'27 Arbitra-
tors, operating within the flexible confines of their roles,
potentially are able to bring to bear a wealth of knowledge and
experience about the commercial or industrial settings of dis-
putes, the terms of agreement commonly used by actors within
those settings, and standards of performance imposed by con-
tract and common expectations to the process of dispute resolu-
tion. 2 ' Efficient disposition of disputes by arbitration assertedly
helps to preserve the maintenance of peace in the work place'29
and offers an economical substitute for litigation of commercial
controversies. 130 Courts adopting the Wiley approach presuma-
bly do so in the hopes of furthering these salutary purposes. 131
that arbitration clauses in investor agreements with securities brokers are enforceable for
disputes arising the Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (recognizing arbitrability of RICO claims and claims arising
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465
U.S. 1 (1984) (ordering arbitration of action under state franchise investment statute).
125. See, e.g., Island Creek Coal Sales Co. v. City of Gainesville, 729 F.2d 1046, 1049
(6th Cir. 1984) (temporary injunction); Mobil Oil Indonesia v. Asamera Oil, 487 F. Supp.
63, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (reformation); Staklinski v. Pyramid Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 163-64,
160 N.E.2d 78, 80, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541, 543 (1959) (specific performance); Ruppert v.
Egelhofer, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1958) (injunction).
126. See, e.g., Willoughby Roofing & Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, 598 F. Supp. 353
(N.D. Ala. 1984), aff'd, 776 F.2d 269 (11th Cir. 1985). See generally Stipanowich, supra
note 13.
127. Conticommodity Servs. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1224 (2d Cir. 1980)
(noting that the Federal Arbitration Act "carefully limits the role of the courts in consid-
ering motions to compel arbitration" to prevent frustration of the goals of arbitration,
which is "a speedy and relatively inexpensive trial before specialists" that "eases the
workload of the courts").
128. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 435-38, 447-50 (1988) (discussing
the perception that arbitrators are knowledgeable and experienced triers of fact).
129. See United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578,
581 (1960) (describing the function of arbitration as a "substitute for industrial strife").
130. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 433-35, 438-47, 450-53 (addressing
perceptions regarding the relative informality, flexibility, speed, and economy of
arbitration).
131. See, e.g., Conticommodity Servs. 613 F.2d at 1224; Bartley, Inc. v. Jefferson
Parish School Bd., 302 So. 2d 280, 283 (La. 1974).
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1. Procedural Issues and Arbitrator Expertise
Commercial arbitrators typically are chosen for their perti-
nent knowledge and expertise. Members of the national con-
struction panel of the American Arbitration Association, which
furnishes arbitrators for thousands of construction cases each
year, generally are contractors, engineers, architects, owner rep-
resentatives, or lawyers with construction experience. 132 Con-
struction arbitration panels tend to be multidisciplinary, repre-
senting a range of construction experience as well as a diversity
of professional viewpoint.13 3 The hope is that disputes will be
resolved with an informed understanding of pertinent contract
terms and usages and an appreciation of the reasonable expecta-
tions of the parties.
If the parties have described the arbitrators' authority as
extending to "any controversy or [c]laim arising out of or related
to the [c]ontract, or the breach thereof," 34 one may logically
conclude that this authorization encompasses interpretation of
contractual provisions governing the resolution of disputes.'35
From a policy perspective, it is appealing to accord the same
flexible, informed approach to procedural compliance issues that
arbitrators bring to their interpretive roles generally.136 A proper
132. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 438.
133. See id. The American Arbitration Association (AAA) has a policy of appointing
three-member panels in cases in which more than $100,000 is in dispute. See id. at 438 n.
72.
134. AIA A201, supra note 14, § 4.5.1.
135. See Pettinaro Constr. Co. v. Harry C. Partridge, Jr. & Sons, Inc., 408 A.2d 957,
963 (Del. Ch. 1979) (reasoning that "the question of what procedure must be followed to
initiate the arbitration process is . . . a matter of construing the contract and thus
within the scope of the arbitration agreement"); Shamokin Area School Auth. v. Farfield
Co., 308 Pa. Super. 271, 274, 454 A.2d 126, 127 (1982) (concluding that when "the parties
have agreed to arbitrate all issues arising from the contractual relationship, procedural
questions such as timeliness are reserved for the arbitrators"); see also Livingston v.
John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d 52, 62 (2d Cir. 1963) (citing a number of sources for
the proposition that labor arbitration agreements should include "implementation of the
arbitration clause and its procedural aspects"), aff'd, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
136. One court reasoned:
Procedural questions often cannot be resolved without construing the contract
as a whole and without considering the transactions under the contract in light
of the customs and practices of the industry. This task is peculiarly within the
competence of the arbitrator, who will presumably hold the parties to the es-
sence of their bargain.
Village of Carpentersville v. Mayfair Constr. Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 128, 133, 426 N.E.2d
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understanding of the realities of the job site may be as essential
to determination of what constitutes a reasonable time for sub-
mission of an arbitration demand as it is to establishing the pro-
priety of a claim for extras.3 7 Moreover, as previously noted,
questions of adherence to procedural formulae occasionally may
be intermingled with the merits of the underlying dispute.138
Countervailing arguments, however, can be made. Although
arbitrators' informed discretion may be preferable to judicial
resolution when it comes to filling gaps and resolving ambigui-
ties in a contract, arbitrator expertise may offer fewer advan-
tages when contract terms are clear and specific. 39 Arguably,
courts are just as well equipped to apply lengthy, detailed dis-
pute resolution provisions that establish explicit guidelines for
treatment of claims and controversies. Moreover, arbitrators
often lack legal training and may be uncomfortable disposing of
a case on the basis of a missed deadline or other procedural de-
fect; courts, on the other hand, are equipped by training and
experience to deal with such issues in summary fashion. Thus, it
is hard to justify blanket submission of "procedural" issues to
arbitrators strictly on the basis of relative expertise.
2. Procedural Issues and Concerns Regarding Avoidance of
Delay
In Wiley the Supreme Court expressed the concern that ju-
dicial handling of "procedural" elements of an otherwise arbitra-
ble dispute would create "opportunities for deliberate delay" as
well as "the possibility of well-intentioned but no less serious
558, 562-63 (1981)..
137. See Graham Contracting, Inc. v. Flagler County, 444 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1984) (deferring question of whether demand was brought within reasonable time
to arbitrators).
138. See supra notes 104-113 and accompanying text.
139. See Note, supra note 13, at 1469-70. The length and specificity of the dispute
resolution provisions in the AIA General Conditions has been noted. See supra notes 15-
20 and accompanying text.
On the other hand, even specific and seemingly straightforward contract language
may benefit from an informed interpretation. As observed in Bel Pre Medical Center,
Inc. v. Frederick Contractors, Inc., 21 Md. App. 307, 320 A.2d 558 (Ct. Spec. App. 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 274 Md. 307, 334 A.2d 526 (1975), parties expect the expert
arbitrator to "produce a judgment which is founded not only upon a literal meaning of
the words appearing in the contract document itself, but also their meaning in the con-
text of the practices and customs associated with their use." Id. at 316, 320 A.2d at 563.
8671989]
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delay. ' 140 The Court thus echoed the decision of the Second Cir-
cuit in the same case, in which Judge Medina, speaking for a
unanimous court, stated:
It is of the essence of arbitration that it be speedy and that the
source of friction between the parties be promptly elimi-
nated .... The numerous cases involving a great variety of
procedural niceties. . . make it abundantly clear that, were we
to decide that procedural questions under an arbitration clause
of a collective bargaining agreement are for the court, we would
open the door wide to all kinds of technical obstructionism.141
The court of appeals therefore concluded that whether or not a
matter of procedural compliance required special expertise and
familiarity with industry conditions and practices, such ques-
tions should be left to the arbitrator.
142
Avoiding threshold obstacles is a highly desirable goal in
both commercial and labor arbitration.143 Parties adopting such
processes often are attracted by abbreviated prehearing proce-
dures and relaxed evidentiary rules that hold out the promise of
efficient and economical dispute resolution.1 4 4 Such expectations
may be frustrated if hearings are postponed for months or years
by litigation over enforcement issues.14 5 If a claimant seeks arbi-
tration of a matter that is arguably within the scope of the
agreement to arbitrate, deferring questions of missed deadlines
and other procedural issues to arbitration should discourage par-
ties from litigating such defenses, increase public confidence in
the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate, reduce expendi-
tures of participants' time and money, and conserve judicial
resources.
As compelling as these arguments may be, however, one
may question whether the desire for speed and economy is suffi-
cient justification for wholesale elimination of an entire class of
140. 376 U.S. at 558.
141. Livingston v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 313 F.2d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1963).
142. See id. at 63-64.
143. See id. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 438-40 (discussing speed
and efficiency of arbitration process).
144. See id.
145. See id. at 451. If it is ultimately determined that the dispute is arbitrable, "the
arbitrator would ordinarily remain free to reconsider the ground covered by the court
insofar as it bore on the merits of the dispute," thus compounding pre-arbitration delays.
See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 558.
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defenses to arbitrability. Modern courts routinely consider issues
under the heading of "substantive arbitrability" - that is, is-
sues addressing the scope of the parties' agreement to submit
disputes to arbitration.14 The widespread use of broad form ar-
bitration clauses and the liberality of judicial interpretation typ-
ically result in judicial compulsion of arbitration proceedings
and undoubtedly have reduced litigation of "substantive arbi-
trability" questions. 147 The courts, however, have never sug-
gested that such questions are wholly inappropriate for judicial
consideration; their treatment is considered an essential element
in effectuating the intent of the parties. 4 '
While permitting courts to entertain procedural compliance
issues may only delay the commencement of arbitration hear-
ings, in some cases judicial prescreening of claims may lead to
more rapid resolution of disputes. Should a court refuse to order
arbitration of a claim or dispute, the effect in most cases would
be like that of a summary judgment: the matter is resolved short
of a full hearing on the merits. 4 9 Although a party is foreclosed
from pursuing a desired remedy, all participants are spared the
time and expense of preparation and presentation of the case
before a panel of arbitrators.
Deferring such matters along with substantive controversies
to arbitrators, on the other hand, may postpone their considera-
tion until the conclusion of a decision on the merits. Such treat-
ment may be appropriate when procedural questions are inextri-
cably intertwined with the basic issues of the case, as in the
146. See Wiley, 376 U.S. at 546-47; Contracting Northwest, Inc. v. City of Freder-
icksburg, 713 F.2d 382, 384 (8th Cir. 1983); see also supra note 120 and accompanying
text.
147. See supra notes 119-127. See generally M. DomKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
§ 12, at 151-59 (G. Wilner ed. 1984) (reviewing judicial decisions affecting arbitrability
and observing that "[t]he restrictive approach in interpreting the scope of arbitration
agreements which results in the removal of certain controversies from the arbitration
process, generally has been eliminated by [judicial] decisions"). When whether the sub-
ject matter of the dispute falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement is unclear,
legislative policy favoring arbitration dictates deferring the matter to the arbitrator. See
Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., 514 F.2d 614, 617 (1st Cir. 1975); Gold Coast Mall,
Inc. v. Larmar, 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1983).
148. Absent an express agreement to arbitrate disputes instead of submitting them
to the courts, no party may be required to submit to arbitration. See M. DoMKE, supra
note 147, § 1.01, at 1.
149. See, e.g., River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v. Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 110
N.E.2d 545 (1953).
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foregoing hypothetical. 150 Other situations may arise, however, in
which the arbitrators' own lack of confidence or experience in
dealing with procedural issues causes them to postpone ruling on
such matters until the entire case has been heard. Such pos-
sibilities are enhanced by the fact that many arbitrators lack le-
gal training or judicial experience, and most arbitrations are
conducted in the relative absence of procedural rules governing
disposition of such issues."'
As the foregoing discussion reveals, whether the general
purposes and goals of arbitration are best served by consistently
deferring issues of procedural compliance to arbitrators is debat-
able. Although parties may incorporate an agreement to arbi-
trate with the goal of having arbitrators deal with all issues as
speedily and efficiently as possible, procedural requirements also
may be intended as a device for screening claims and disputes
before they ever reach an arbitration panel.
3. Furthering the Parties' Intentions
The commitment to arbitrate is a contractual agreement. By
contract the parties establish arbitration as the forum for dis-
pute resolution, define its jurisdiction, and determine its charac-
teristics.'52 Not surprisingly, contract-based arguments have
been offered by those favoring justiciability of matters associ-
ated with procedural terms, as well as by those supporting arbi-
trability of such issues.
No party may be compelled to arbitrate a dispute until he
has agreed to do so.1'3 When parties have agreed that certain
steps - such as filing a demand or submission of disputes to a
design professional - shall be performed prior to arbitration,
some courts believe the mutual intent of the parties can be given
effect only by a judicial refusal to compel arbitration except
150. See supra text accompanying notes 110-113.
151. See generally Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 433-35 (discussing the informalities
of arbitration proceedings). Moreover, if the arbitrators' decision on procedural matters
is challenged, the appellate process will result in postponement of the ultimate award.
See Willis-Knighton Medical Center v. Southern Builders, Inc., 392 So. 2d 505, 508 (La.
Ct. App. 1980) (reasoning that "issues of procedural arbitrability should not be decided
by the courts without first having been submitted to the arbitrator").
152. See Willis-Knighton, 392 So. 2d at 508.
153. See supra note 148.
870 [Vol. 40
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when stipulated procedures have been properly observed.154
If procedural limitations are imposed by a contract provid-
ing for arbitration of "all disputes" or the equivalent, however, a
number of courts take a very different view of the parties' intent
in establishing procedural limitations. Wiley and its progeny
stand for the proposition that under an agreement of such broad
scope, arbitrators must consider all issues, including procedural
matters.
155
Although their focus upon the parties' intentions is appro-
priate, these opposing judicial philosophies are equally flawed in
their attempts to define and dispose of "procedural arbi-
trability" issues in monolithic fashion. Arbitration is not a mon-
olithic phenomenon. In each case it is what the parties desire it
to be: complex or simple; extended or abbreviated; wide-ranging
or narrowly focused. 156 Participants desiring maximum speed
and efficiency may submit to a streamlined procedure under
which all contract-related issues are arbitrable and few road-
blocks are placed in the way of a party desiring arbitration.
Other parties, perhaps hoping to end disputes before formal ad-
versary procedures begin, may opt for multistage processes simi-
lar to labor grievance procedures and place various limitations
on the right to arbitrate. Courts are required to effectuate the
parties' intent regarding dispute resolution even if the result is
not the most efficient and expeditious means of resolving contro-
versies. 157 As the Supreme Court noted in one recent case con-
cerning application of the Federal Arbitration Act:
[Plassage of the Act was motivated, first and foremost, by a
congressional desire to enforce agreements into which parties
had entered, and we must not overlook this principal objective
when construing the statute, or allow the fortuitous impact of
the Act on efficient dispute resolution to overshadow the un-
derlying motivation. 58
154. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
155. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 559 (concluding that
"[a]lthough a party may resist arbitration once a grievance has arisen, we think it best
accords with the usual purposes of an arbitration clause . . . to regard procedural dis-
agreements [as arbitrable aspects of the dispute]"); see also supra note 135 and accom-
panying text.
156. See Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 433.
157. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985).
158. Id. at 220.
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A logical resolution of the problem of "procedural arbi-
trability" requires careful attention to the language by which
parties have bound themselves to arbitrate and the guidelines
established by modern statutes for judicial enforcement of those
agreements. Assisted by traditional rules of contract construc-
tion, it is possible to delineate an ordered scheme for treatment
of contractual time limitations and other constraints on
arbitration.
IV. A PROPOSED APPROACH TO PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS ON
ARBITRATION
A. The Separability Principle and Contractual Limitations
Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), agreements to ar-
bitrate are "valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract."'159 As interpreted, this provision establishes that
agreements to arbitrate may be denied enforcement on the same
bases courts refuse to give legal effect to agreements generally. 60
This basic proposition governs judicial treatment of requests for
orders staying litigation of arbitrable matters and for orders
compelling arbitration.' Most modern state arbitration statutes
contain similar language.6 2
A cardinal principle of judicial action under the FAA and
similar state statutes is the separability doctrine, which rests
upon the concept that the agreement to arbitrate is separate and
independent from the contract in which it is contained.66 The
doctrine is in part the ironic result of judicial antipathy toward
arbitration that traditionally led courts to "sever" arbitration
clauses from the contract in order to declare them invalid and
159. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
160. See M. DOMKE, supra note 147, § 4.03, at 31; see also Loomis, Inc. v. Cudahy,
104 Idaho 106, 108, 656 P.2d 1359, 1361-62 (1983) (citing cases defining "revocation" as
used in arbitration statutes).
161. Loomis, Inc., 104 Idaho at 108, 656 P.2d at 1361.
162. See UNIp. ARBITRATION AcT § 1, 7 U.L.A 5 (1955).
163. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404-05
(1967) (concluding that fraud issues implicating the contract containing the arbitration
agreement did not affect arbitrability under the FAA); Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devon-
shire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409-11 (2d Cir. 1959). See generally Annotation, Claim
of Fraud in Inducement of Contract as Subject to Compulsory Arbitration Clause Con-
tained in Contract, 11 A.L.R.4TH 774 (1982).
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unenforceable."' In today's more favorable judicial climate,
however, the separability principle operates to preserve the
agreement to arbitrate when the enforceability of the contract,
as a whole, is challenged. 6 5 Enforcement will be barred only
when one party can demonstrate that there is no fairly achieved
agreement to arbitrate or that some other legal or equitable
grounds upon which the agreement to arbitrate, as opposed to
the contract as a whole, should not be enforced."6 This ap-
proach reinforces public policies favoring agreements to arbi-
trate and furthers the presumed intent of the parties to leave
the merits to arbitrators.1
6
7
The separability concept provides a useful starting point for
analyzing contract terms governing disposition of claims and dis-
putes. Under this approach, only procedural terms that directly
affect the duty to arbitrate should be pertinent to the judicial
inquiry. Thus, for example, allegations of noncompliance with a
time limitation where the filing of a demand is a necessary pre-
liminary commencement of arbitration hearing, the failure to
meet a filing deadline might raise an issue regarding the enforce-
ability of the agreement to arbitrate and, therefore, be proper
for judicial consideration.'68 On the other hand, failure to notify
an owner or architect of the existence of differing site conditions
or delay-related claims within a specific period of the happening
of a particular event'6 9 - a matter bearing no relation to the
duty to arbitrate but rather to separate aspects of the container
contract that are for the arbitrator - should play no part in the
court's judgment regarding arbitrability. Published decisions, al-
though rarely discussing the underlying rationale, generally re-
164. Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 410.
165. See supra note 163; see also Sauer-Getrieve KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715
F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984) (applying doctrine in
context of allegations that container contract was unconscionable, inequitable, lacking in
consideration, fatally vague, and violative of antitrust laws); Village of Cairo v. Bodine
Contracting Co., 685 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (declaring issue of material breach
of contract arbitrable, except in cases when the issue affects enforceability of arbitration
agreement). But see Borck v. Holewinski, 459 So. 2d 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (re-
jecting separability doctrine).
166. See Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 411.
167. See supra notes 119-130 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Frouge Corp. v. New York City Hous. Auth., 26 A.D.2d 269, 272, 273
N.Y.S.2d 657, 660 (Ct. App. Div. 1966) (per curiam) (denying arbitration because a con-
dition precedent in a housing authority agreement had not been met).
169. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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flect this distinction. 170
As the conflicting judicial responses indicate, however, pro-
cedural prerequisites directly related to arbitration raise more
difficult analytical questions.171 Because such limitations almost
always accompany a provision mandating arbitration of virtually
any controversy associated with the contract or its breach, a sat-
isfactory approach to the former must consider the latter.
B. Treatment of Procedural Limits Under Broad Arbitration
Provisions
The broad mantle of authority conferred upon arbitrators
by clauses committing "all disputes" to arbitration suggest in-
clusion of authority to determine the bounds of their own juris-
diction. It is generally recognized, however, that modern statu-
tory schemes reserve jurisdictional questions, at least initially,
for the courts.172 Moreover, close inspection reveals ample statu-
tory authority for judicial treatment of certain procedural limi-
tations on arbitration.
Significantly, arbitration statutes typically do not distin-
guish between issues of "substantive arbitrability" and "proce-
dural arbitrability" in describing the judicial role in enforcement
of arbitration agreements. 173 The judicial inquiry may be de-
scribed as "substantive" in nature because the court seeks to de-
termine whether the parties agreed to refer the subject matter of
a particular dispute to arbitration and remain bound to do so. In
making this determination, the initial focus falls logically on the
term describing the topical scope of the parties' agreement.1 4
There may be other terms, however, that are procedural in na-
ture and directly affect the basic commitment to arbitrate a dis-
170. See, e.g., Village of Carpentersville v. Mayfair Constr. Co., 100 Ill. App. 3d 128,
131, 426 N.E.2d 558, 561 (1981) (holding that noncompliance with contract provisions
governing claims for additional compensation "[did] not speak to arbitrability. . . [and
therefore was] not relevant to the issue of arbitrability"); Stauffer Constr. Co. v. Board
of Educ., 54 Md. App. 658, 670-72, 460 A.2d 609, 616 (Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (distinguish-
ing procedures that affect the agreement to arbitrate from those that affect the validity
of underlying claims).
171. See supra notes 27-100 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 146-147.
173. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982); UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT
§§ 1, 2, 7 U.L.A. 5, 68, 114 (1955).
174. See supra note 18.
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pute. By conditioning enforcement of the arbitration contract on
compliance with contractual procedures, parties may remove an
otherwise arbitrable dispute from the permissible scope of arbi-
tration. By this logic, so-called "substantive arbitrability" ques-
tions apparently may implicate not only omnibus scope terms
but also procedural limitations on the arbitration agreement.
The fallacy inherent in attempting to resolve arbitrability
issues on the basis of "substance" and "procedure" may be fur-
ther emphasized by comparing the contract terms in Village of
Carpentersville v. Mayfair Construction Co. 175 with those dis-
cussed in Contracting Northwest, Inc. v. City of Fredericks-
burg.176 In Village of Carpentersville the court ruled that a con-
tractor's claim for withheld retainage was arbitrable under an
AIA-type contract even though the claim was never submitted to
the project architect for a preliminary decision. 17 7 It considered
the failure to submit the claim to the architect a question of
"procedural arbitrability" and not an issue going to the sub-
stance of the agreement to arbitrate. 78
In Contracting Northwest, however, the Eighth Circuit re-
viewed a contract in which the parties specifically limited the
substantive scope of arbitration to disputes regarding decisions
of the project engineer. 79 Although the court, in ordering arbi-
tration of certain disputes, espoused the same principles enunci-
ated in Carpentersville,s0 it was not faced with a claimant who
had failed to submit claims for decision by the engineer. Had
that been the case, as it was in Carpentersville, the Eighth Cir-
cuit presumably would have considered the question a justicia-
ble one dealing with the breadth of the parties' agreement and
not a "procedural" matter. If procedural limitations can be de-
scribed so easily in substantive terms, categorical treatment on
the basis of such distinctions exalts form over substance.
Judicial review of arbitrability questions should not begin
and end with a consideration of only one aspect of the agree-
ment to arbitrate. Courts must deal with the arbitration contract
175. 100 Ill. App. 3d 128, 426 N.E.2d 558 (1981).
176. 713 F.2d 382 (8th Cir. 1983).
177. See 100 Il. App. 3d at 134, 426 N.E.2d at 563.
178. See id.
179. The contract provided that "a dispute about any matter involving the decision
of the Engineer" was arbitrable. 713 F.2d at 386.
180. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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in its entirety and address all terms, regardless of their form,
that represent explicit limits on enforceability of that agree-
ment. A more logical approach to handling time limits and other
contractual prerequisites is to ascertain whether noncompliance
with a particular provision raises a legitimate issue regarding en-
forcement of the arbitration agreement. The New York courts
effectively have framed the issue of "procedural arbitrability" in
terms of the law of conditions:18' if parties clearly have stipu-
lated that the duty to perform under the arbitration agreement
is conditioned upon the happening of certain specified events,
their intent should be honored regardless of the breadth of the
term defining the substantive scope of the arbitration
agreement.
182
181. See supra notes 74-100 and accompanying text.
182. In United Nations Dev. Corp. v. Norkin Plumbing Co., Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 358, 380
N.E.2d 253, 408 N.Y.S.2d 424 (1978), the New York Court of Appeals described such
situations as a narrow exception to the rule that under broad arbitration clauses "com-
pliance with contractual notice provisions as well as time requirements. . . are issues to
be determined by the arbitrator." Id. at 363, 380 N.E.2d at 255-56, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 427.
The court reasoned that "compliance with contractual limitations, expressly made condi-
tions precedent to arbitration by the parties' agreement, is a question for threshold judi-
cial resolution." Id. at 364, 380 N.E.2d at 256, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 428 (citations omitted).
In County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 1, 409 N.E.2d 951, 431
N.Y.S.2d 478 (1980), the New York court further described the process by which courts
should make the determination regarding arbitrability:
The parties are entitled first to a judicial determination whether there was
a valid agreement to arbitrate. If the court determines that the parties had not
made an agreement to arbitrate, that concludes the matter and a stay of arbi-
tration will be granted or the application to compel arbitration will be de-
nied. . . . Similarly, if the court concludes that, while the parties may have
made a valid agreement to arbitrate, the particular agreement they made was
of limited or restricted scope and the particular claim sought to be arbitrated
is outside that scope, there will likewise be a stay of arbitration or a denial of
the motion to compel arbitration. ...
If, however, it is concluded that the parties did make an agreement to
arbitrate and that the particular claim sought to be arbitrated comes within
the scope of their agreement, there then may be a second threshold question
for judicial determination - has the agreement that they made been complied
with? This calls for a judicial determination as to whether there is any prelimi-
nary requirement or condition precedent to arbitration to be complied with,
and if so, whether there has been compliance with such requirement or condi-
tion precedent. Thus, the parties may have erected a prerequisite to the sub-
mission of any dispute to arbitration, in effect a precondition to access to the
arbitral forum. In such event the reluctant party may be forced to arbitration
only if the court determines that this portion of the agreement has been com-
plied with . ..
Id. at 7-8, 409 N.E.2d at 953-54, 431,N.Y.S.2d at 480-82 (citations omitted).
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Conditions have never been favored as a matter of judicial
interpretation. The Restatement of Contracts provides that
when doubts arise about whether a stipulated event is a condi-
tion to a party's performance, courts prefer an interpretation
that will reduce the risk that the other party will suffer a forfei-
ture of his expectations in the exchange. 183 Even if the event
falls within the control of the party expecting performance,
courts prefer when possible to avoid interpreting the happening
of the event as a condition of the other party's performance obli-
gation. 84 Moreover, although a contract term clearly is a condi-
tion, the court may excuse the nonoccurrence of that condition if
the consequence of its enforcement would be disproportionate
forfeiture.
185
Applied to terms associated with the agreement to arbitrate,
these general principles of contract law reinforce legislative and
judicial policies favoring arbitration of disputes and deferring
doubtful questions to arbitration. 8 ' They may provide a court
with a rationale for distinguishing a term that "is in essence a
prerequisite to entry into the arbitration process" from a provi-
sion functioning as "a procedural prescription for the manage-
ment of [the arbitration] process." '87
For example, consider the familiar requirement of AIA-type
construction contracts that demands for arbitration be made
Presumably the same end could be accomplished by a contract provision clearly
describing the nonoccurrence of an event, such as filing a demand within a specified
time, as grounds for discharge of the opposing party's duty to arbitrate. Although ex-
pressed in the form of a condition subsequent, the term likely will be interpreted as
creating what traditionally has been described as a condition precedent to the duty to
arbitrate. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 227(3) comment e, illustrations
12, 13 (1979) [hereainfter RESTATEMENT].
A number of courts have addressed noncompliance with procedural limitations in
the context of waiver of the contractual right to arbitrate. See, e.g., supra text accompa-
nying notes 35-38. Although an analysis of the waiver defense to arbitrability is beyond
the scope of this article, this vague concept clearly fails to advance the foregoing analysis
in the case of procedural limitations on the right to arbitration.
183. RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 227(1). See generally E. FARNSWORTH, CON-
TRACTS § 8.4, at 548-55 (1982).
184. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 227(2); see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra
note 183, § 8.4, at 550-51.
185. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 229; see also E. FARNSWORTH, supra note
183, § 8.4, at 552.
186. See supra notes 119-122.
187. County of Rockland, 51 N.Y.2d at 9, 409 N.E.2d at 954, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
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"within a reasonable time after the [cilaim has arisen."'"" In the
American Arbitration Association procedure embodied in the
AIA documents, filing a demand is a necessary step in bringing a
claim or dispute before a panel of arbitrators."8 9 The filing re-
quirement is also a contractual event within the claimant's con-
trol, yet it is not expressly identified as a condition precedent to
the other party's duty to arbitrate. Under traditional principles
of contract interpretation, the preferable interpretation is that
the term does not establish such a condition.9 0 This result is
also supported by the broad language of the AIA arbitration
agreement 91 and by modern legislative and judicial policies
favoring arbitrability of disputes. 9 2 These policies also dictate
that once a court determines that the duty to arbitrate is not
clearly conditioned on fulfillment of the requirement, it should
defer further consideration of the matter to the arbitration
panel.1 9 3 The arbitrators ultimately may conclude that under all
the circumstances, the demand was made within a reasonable
time or, alternatively, that there was a failure of compliance. In
the case of failure of compliance, the arbitrators, acting within
the flexible contours of their own authority to resolve disputes
under omnibus arbitration provisions, may decline to hear the
affected claim, award damages for noncompliance, or render
such other relief as they consider appropriate.
9 4
188. AIA A201, supra note 14, § 4.3.2; see also supra text accompanying note 20.
189. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ARBITRATION RULES
§ 7 (Sept. 1, 1988).
190. See supra note 184. In such cases it is preferable to regard the term governing
the filing of a demand as creating a promise. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 227(2).
Because the court is only considering the effect of the term on arbitrability of the under-
lying dispute, however, such characterization is irrelevant except to the extent that it
identifies the term as creating something other than a condition of the duty to arbitrate.
191. See supra note 18.
192. See supra notes 119-131.
193. See, e.g., United Nations Dev. Corp. v. Norkin Plumbing Co., 45 N.Y.2d 358,
365, 380 N.E.2d 253, 256-57, 431 N.Y.S.2d 424, 428 (1978) (committing question of time-
liness to arbitral determination under broad AIA-form scope provision in absence of
clear condition precedent); Pearl St. Dev. Corp. v. Conduit & Found. Corp., 41 N.Y.2d
167, 359 N.E.2d 693, 291 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1976) (holding question of time limitations in
prime contract arbitrable under broad arbitration provision in subcontract); see also
Conticommodity Servs., Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1226 (2d Cir. 1980) (ex-
plaining that judicial refusal to deny arbitration on basis of a time limitation does not
render such limits meaningless, since presumably the arbitrator will address the
provision).
194. Although fulfillment of conditions precedent "is a question at least initially for
878 [Vol. 40
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The AIA General Conditions apparently are intended to
condition the parties' obligations to arbitrate upon presubmis-
sion of claims to the project architect. The architect's decision
on a particular claim is "required as a condition precedent to
arbitration or litigation" of that subject matter.195 While the
drafters might have made their intentions even clearer by
describing initial submission to the design professional as a
"prerequisite to judicial enforcement of the agreement to arbi-
trate" or by the use of similar language, one reasonably may as-
sume that courts will view the provision as making the effect of
noncompliance a justiciable issue. This screening device should
be accorded the same judicial deference as a scope provision that
limits arbitration to certain controversies or makes certain issues
nonarbitrable. 96 In such cases the court should address the
question of noncompliance and its effect upon the arbitration
agreement. In addition to the factual question of noncompliance,
the court should consider other arguments against enforcing the
condition. In some cases, for example, it may be unclear whether
or not a particular condition applies to those disputes before the
court. 9 ' The effect of noncompliance may differ depending upon
the court," once a case is referred to arbitration, questions of fact or law come under the
"judicially unreviewable purview of the arbitrator." Raisler Corp. v. New York City
Hous. Auth., 32 N.Y.2d 274, 282, 208 N.E.2d 91, 94, 344 N.Y.S.2d 917, 922 (1973) (quot-
ing In re S & W Fine Foods, 8 A.D.2d 130, 131, 185 N.Y.S.2d 1021, 1022 (Ct. App. Div.
1959), aff'd, 7 N.Y.2d 1018, 166 N.E.2d 853, 200 N.Y.S.2d 59 (1960)). As a general pro-
position, then, once a court determines for any reason that arbitration is not barred by
noncompliance with a procedural term, procedural issues apparently may be raised
before the arbitrator. See Acevedo Maldonado v. PPG Indus., Inc., 514 F.2d 614, 617 (1st
Cir. 1975) (reasoning that "[t]he arbitrator must ultimately pass on the outer boundaries
of what is arbitrable"). The Supreme Court has reserved the question of "the arbitrator's
authority to consider arbitrability following referral." Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358,
Bakery & Confectionery Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 255 n.8 (1977).
As a practical matter, the limited scope of judicial review and the tendency to avoid
written opinions in commercial arbitrations are profound obstacles to vacating arbitrator
decisions. See Stipanowich, supra note 13, at 982-86; Stipanowich, supra note 2, at 439.
195. The General Conditions provide:
Claims, including those alleging an error or omission by the Architect, shall be
referred initially to the Architect for action. . . .A decision by the Architect
• ..shall be required as a condition precedent to arbitration or litigation of a
Claim between the contractor and owner . . ..
AIA A201, supra note 14, § 4.3.2.
196. In the AIA General Conditions, the "condition precedent" language of § 4.3.2
actually is reinforced by limitations on the substantive scope of the arbitration agree-
ment. See supra note 18.
197. See, e.g, County of Rockland v. Primiano Constr. Co., 51 N.Y.2d 1, 409 N.E.2d
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the status of the actor; a long line of cases holds that those de-
fending claims, unlike those pursuing them, have no obligation
to comply with contractual time limits and other preconditions
to arbitration. 98 A condition may be avoided, moreover, if it is
unconscionable or effectively deprives the claimant of a
remedy.10 19
Perhaps most important is a court's discretion to deny en-
forcement of a condition when a party's noncompliance results
in serious forfeiture. 00 The nonoccurrence of a condition prece-
dent to arbitration typically jeopardizes not only the right to ar-
bitrate but also the availability of any remedy. Because arbitra-
tion agreements usually describe the procedure as the sole
mechanism for dispute resolution, foreclosure of that avenue
eliminates all chance of relief for a party pursuing a claim or
seeking third-party resolution of disputes.20 ' Under the circum-
stances courts should carefully consider the purpose of contrac-
tual time limits and other express conditions and excuse non-
compliance that does not hinder those goals.20 By barely
missing a deadline for filing an arbitration demand, for example,
a claimant may sacrifice any possibility of recovering substantial
sums in damages. If the purpose of setting a deadline for filing a
demand is to alert the opposing party and to permit relatively
prompt investigation of the facts underlying the dispute, how-
ever, a filing that is late by only a few days might fulfill these
goals. Under these circumstances a court might not hold the
951, 431 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1980) (holding that noncompliance with a provision making sub-
mission of disputes to the project architect a condition precedent to arbitration did not
prevent arbitration of a delay claim asserted two years after project completion).
198. See, e.g., Milton Schwartz & Assocs. v. Magness Corp., 368 F. Supp. 749 (D.
Del. 1974); Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 468 A.2d 91 (1984).
199. See, e.g., Brown & Guenther v. North Queensview Homes, Inc., 18 A.D.2d 327,
239 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Ct. App. Div. 1963) (holding that provision requiring arbitration de-
mand to be brought within fifteen days after dispute had arisen was unenforceable be-
cause it was unreasonable and fatally vague); see also River Brand Rice Mills, Inc. v.
Latrobe Brewing Co., 305 N.Y. 36, 41, 110 N.E.2d 545, 547 (1953) (indicating that a time
limitation requiring a demand to be made within five days after tender of goods might be
found "so ambiguous or so unreasonably harsh ... as to be unenforceable").
200. See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
201. See River Brand Rice Mills, 305 N.Y. 36, 110 N.E.2d 545 (1953) (foreclosing
judicial action in light of claimant's failure to demand arbitration in accordance with the
parties' contract).
202. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 182, § 229 comments a, b (1979).
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claimant to the consequences of strict compliance.0 3
With these considerations in mind a court may treat explicit
procedural limitations on the arbitration contract with the same
dignity accorded to limitations on the substantive scope. In each
case all doubts about the effect of a term, or noncompliance with
that term, should be resolved in favor of enforcing the arbitra-
tion contract and leaving ultimate resolution of disputes to the
arbitrators.20 4 Although judicial resolution of arbitrability issues
inevitably results in a delay to the commencement of arbitration
proceedings, this approach best effectuates the clear intent of
the parties while paying heed to compelling policies favoring ar-
bitration. In some cases, moreover, it may substantially reduce
the duration and cost of dispute resolution.20 5
V. CONCLUSION
Motivated by the desire to avoid judicial encroachment
upon the realm of the arbitrator under broadly framed agree-
ments to arbitrate - a goal consistent with contemporary public
policies encouraging arbitration of disputes - many courts have
decided that if disputes are otherwise arbitrable, "procedural
arbitrability" questions are routinely submissible to arbitration.
Unfortunately, neither this sweeping approach nor any other at-
tempt to treat procedural issues categorically is supported by
the concerns identified by its adherents.
Applying well defined common-law precepts regarding con-
ditions of performance to the arbitration agreement itself, par-
ties may establish procedural as well as substantive limits that
courts may consider in giving effect to such agreements under
modern statutes. Even so, the purposes and policies underlying
such legislation severely limit the judicial role. Procedural non-
compliance should prevent arbitration only when a clear bar to
the enforceability of the agreement unavoidably mandates a de-
nial of the right to arbitrate; all doubts should be resolved in
favor of arbitrability.
203. Id. comment b, illustration 2.
204. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
1989]
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